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Abstract. This paper argues that IT failures diagnosed as errors at the technical 
or project management level are often mistakenly pointing to symptoms of 
failure rather than a project’s underlying socio-complexity (complexity 
resulting from the interactions of people and groups) which is usually the actual 
source of failure. We propose a novel method that adopts a socio-complexity 
lens, Stakeholder Impact Analysis, that can be used to identify risks associated 
with socio-complexity as it is grounded in insights from the social sciences, 
psychology and management science. This paper demonstrates the effectiveness 
of Stakeholder Impact Analysis by using the 1992 London Ambulance Service 
Computer Aided Dispatch project as a case study, and shows that had our 
method been used to identify the risks and had they been mitigated, it would 
have reduced the risk of project failure. This paper’s original contribution 
comprises adopting a socio-complexity lens and expanding upon existing 
accounts of failure by examining failures at a level of granularity not seen 
elsewhere that enables the underlying socio-complexity sources of risk to be 
identified. 
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1   Introduction 
IT failures have been plaguing the implementation of IT systems since their 
introduction into organisations in the 1960s. Today’s economic practices are more 
dependent upon IT than ever before and therefore understanding and preventing IT 
failures is even more worthy of academic study and industrial investment. There is a 
disciplinary history of analysing IT failures as technical failures and in more recent 
times broadening this to include project management and organisational factors. This 
paper’s original contribution expands upon the existing body of IT failure studies by 
arguing that IT failures diagnosed as errors at the technical or project management 
level are often mistakenly pointing to symptoms of failure rather than a project’s 
underlying socio-complexity which is regularly the actual source of failure. 
This paper demonstrates the effectiveness of Stakeholder Impact Analysis by using 
the 1992/1996 London Ambulance Service Computer Aided Dispatch 
(LASCAD92/96) projects as a case study, and shows that had our method been used 
to identify the risks and had they been mitigated, it would have reduced the risk of 
project failure. The Stakeholder Impact Analysis method is based on a framework that 
examines failures at a level of granularity not seen elsewhere, which enables the 
underlying socio-complexity sources of risk to be identified rather than its symptoms 
at the technical and project management level. 
The paper is structured such that: Section 2 introduces the case-study, and studies 
of IT failure and their deficiencies; Section 3 describes socio-complexity and the 
Stakeholder Conflict Matrix; Section 4 details the paper’s case-study methodology; 
Section 5 summarises the results; Section 6 describes the lessons learned; and Section 
7 concludes the paper and discusses future work. 
2    Background 
 
2.1  Studies of IT Failure 
Information System Development (ISD) failure is an ongoing theme in the study of 
large scale complex IT systems and is especially well researched in the Information 
Systems (IS) literature. Failure is, by nature, not a well-defined concept as it is the 
consequence of an evaluation that a stakeholder applies to a system, or project, at a 
particular time with respect to their expectations [1]. It has been demonstrated that 
over-time a stakeholder’s perception of an ISD project changes with time and is 
dependent upon their perspective and the legitimacy of other voices over time [2]. In 
consequence the literature identifies many broad types of failure e.g. Correspondence 
failure; Process failure; and Interaction failure [3, 4]. Correspondence failure where 
the ‘wrong’ thing is delivered but to the ‘correct’ budget and schedule, process failure 
is where the ‘correct’ thing is delivered but to the wrong budget or schedule, and 
interaction failure where the ‘correct’ thing is delivered to the ‘correct’ budget and 
schedule but stakeholders do not use the system 
ISD failure is studied using two dominant approaches, identifying failure factors, 
and identifying failure processes/dynamics [1]. Both approaches are based on the 
hypothesis that if the causes of failure can be identified, we can monitor and control 
those risks. Early studies focused on simple causes and often identified the cause as 
the shortcomings of individual IT practitioners or IT managers. However [5] 
identified that most of the difficulties were social and behavioural rather than 
technical. This result was confirmed and generalised by [6] and later by [7]. 
The bulk of the research has therefore identified social and behaviour factors 
associated with failure and these factors have typically been treated as causes of 
failure despite the fact that few large-scale statistical studies exist to illustrate how 
risk factors correlate with ISD project performance. 
2.2     Risk Identification & Management Methods 
Risks are events or situations that may adversely affect project performance. 
According to [8] risk exposure (RE) is a function of the probability of an adverse 
outcome P(OU) and the loss to parties if the adverse outcome occurs L(OU); 
therefore, RE = P(OU)*L(UO). Risk is managed in IT projects using a two-step 
procedure: risk assessment, and risk control. Risk assessment comprises 
identification, analysis and prioritization, which means possible sources of events that 
may cause adverse outcomes are elicited, their likelihood of occurrence and their 
consequences are estimated and then finally the risks are ranked for importance. Risk 
control comprises planning and management, resolution and monitoring, which means 
plans are made documenting how each risk will be dealt with (e.g. avoidance, 
transfer, reduction), these plans are executed and then the effectiveness of the plans 
are monitored and corrective action is taken where appropriate. 
Project risks are normally identified by a risk analyst using their personal 
experience, project files, historical data and supplementary data collected on the basis 
of one-to-one interviews or analyst led working groups. In all these situations support 
tools such as checklists, models or prompts may be used to focus attention on a 
particular area of risk [9, 10]. There exist many checklists and models which focus on 
different aspects of projects [8, 11-14] e.g. aspects that authors believe significantly 
contribute to process failure, correspondence failure, or interaction failure. These 
identification methods are incorporated into boarder risk management approaches 
such as ‘RiskMan’, ‘RISKIT’ and SODIS [15-17]. We argue that the weakness that 
these existing approaches suffer from is that they point to symptoms of failure rather 
than a project’s underlying socio-complexity (complexity resulting from the 
interactions of people and groups), which is usually the actual source of failure and 
thus the risk that needs to be addressed. 
2.3  The Case study – The London Ambulance Service & LASCAD 
The London Ambulance Service (LAS) is an NHS Trust that provides emergency 
ambulance service to the whole of the London area (approx 620 square miles). 
Similar to other public sector organisations, the LAS exhibits significant socio-
complexity. In 1990 it was involved in a protracted pay and conditions dispute with 
its workers’ union. In 1991, the 268 senior and middle management posts in the LAS 
were cut to 53. The official report of the enquiry into the LAS also commented that 
this restructuring caused a great deal of anxiety to workers creating the perception of 
continual pressure to down-size and improve performance [18]. 
The London Ambulance Service Computer Aided Despatch (LASCAD) project is 
an exemplar of an IT enabled work-transformation project. It comprised the 
automation of the dispatch of ambulances from call taking to ambulance dispatch. The 
need for the automation project was identified in the mid 1980s when the government 
perceived the London Ambulance Service to be failing to modernise and generally 
invest in its work force. After a failed modernisation attempt in 1987, a second 
attempt was initiated in October 1990. The planned implementation date was 8th of 
January 1992 but by March 1992, the second phase of live trials was suspended due to 
the users of the system not having confidence in the system resulting in the Nation 
Union of Public Employees to get involved [8]. Until the 26th October 1992, the 
automated system struggled to satisfy its objectives resulting in ambulances being 
scheduled inefficiently and the system was finally switched off in the following 48 
hours. 
Following this failure a public enquiry was performed as the failure had become 
one of the highest profile IT failures in the UK. The project was revitalised by the 
newly appointed management after its failure in 92, however rather than pursuing the 
same approach as the LASCAD92 failure they opted for a radically different 
approach. The new project, called LASCAD96 in this paper, comprised a non-time 
pressured in-house development project. A custom off-the-shelf (COTS) solution was 
evaluated, but rejected, and a participative approach utilising prototyping was adopted 
to generate user participation and ownership [4]. The initial system was extremely 
simple and improvements were released in small increments where by September 
1996 more radical enhancements were being accepted by the user-base resulting in a 
jump in productivity from 38%-60% of calls being despatched in 3minutes [4]. 
3  Socio-complexity and the Stakeholder Conflict Matrix 
Complexity is the quality or property of being complicated such that an actor is 
unable to make predictions about the consequences of an action as the variables or 
their interactions are not well understood. Socio-complexity comprises the 
complicatedness associated with interactions between people and groups of people. 
This is observed in an organisation, or project organisation, in terms of pluralities of 
perspectives and pluralities of behaviour. Pluralities of perspective can be caused by 
ambiguity, uncertainty, un-surfaced assumptions, differences in interpretive norms, or 
group processes [19]. Pluralities of behaviour can be caused by differences in 
expectations, intentions and behavioural norms [19]. 
Stakeholder resistance is a form of conflict and as such is the embodiment of socio-
complexity and a consequent of the tensions between the pluralities of stakeholders’ 
perspectives and behaviours. Stakeholder resistance can be viewed as a feedback 
mechanism between stakeholders about the goodness of fit between their local 
environment and the intended project. It is for this reason that the Stakeholder Impact 
Analysis method appears to be an interesting risk analysis method as by 
understanding the kinds of thing that would make specific stakeholders, or 
stakeholder groups resist, many specific risks can be identified upfront in a systematic 
manner. 
The Stakeholder Impact Analysis method used in this case study is an 
operationalisation of the Stakeholder Conflict Matrix [20]. The Stakeholder Conflict 
Matrix is the product of a multi-disciplinary literature survey of the sources of conflict 
in social settings. It comprised a review of over 50 articles in journals covering 
Applied Psychology, Administrative Science, Management Science, Social Science, 
Computer Science and Information Systems. The Stakeholder Conflict Matrix helps 
address the limitations of existing studies by approaching failure from a conflict 
perspective thus allowing rigorously designed studies from diverse fields to be 
brought to bear upon our understanding of failure thus providing much needed 
granularity and corroborating findings within CS/Informatics domain. The literature 
review findings are condensed into the Stakeholder Conflict Matrix (Table 1).  
Table 1 - Stakeholder Conflict Matrix 
Conflict Individual Intra-group Inter-group 
Task N/A Disagreement over what to do to achieve aims 
Process N/A Disagreement over how to accomplish task 
Relational 
(Procedural / 
Distributive Injustice) 
N/A 
Unjust delegations of 
status, duty or resources 
within the group 
Unjust 
delegations of 
status, duty or 
resources 
between groups 
Role 
(Time, Resources 
and Capabilities) 
Incompatibility between required activity and practical constraints 
Role (Values, 
Status and 
Satisfaction) 
Incompatibility between required activity 
and an individual’s values, status or 
satisfaction 
Incompatibility between 
required activity and group 
values, status and satisfaction 
Role (Multiple) 
An individual is assigned multiple roles 
with incompatible activities or 
assessment metrics 
A group is assigned multiple 
roles with incompatible 
activities or assessment 
metrics 
Relational 
(Incompatibility 
between actors) 
N/A Negative emotionality between individuals 
Negative 
emotionality 
between groups 
4   Methodology 
A case study methodology was adopted to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
Stakeholder Impact Analysis. Data on the LASCAD project was collected from five 
separate sources: [18] [21] [22] [23] [24] and it was verified that each account broadly 
corroborated one another other to ascertain the reliability of the data. The data was 
analysed using Stakeholder Impact Analysis (SIA) which is an operationalisation of 
the Stakeholder Conflict Matrix. SIA comprises: 1. Identifying key stakeholders; 2. 
Identifying changes in what tasks stakeholder would be required to perform and how 
they were to perform them; 3. Hypothesising what the likely consequences of the 
changes are with regards to stakeholders time, resources, capabilities, values, status 
and satisfaction; 4. Hypothesising the impact of these changes within the wider 
context of relational factors such as tense relationships between individuals or groups 
to which stakeholders belong; 5. Hypothesising whether the stakeholder will perceive 
the change as unjust (either procedurally or distributively) based upon the nature of 
changes and the stakeholders relational context. 
The risks identified using Stakeholder Impact Analysis were used to test two 
hypotheses with the overall aim of illustrating that had Stakeholder Impact Analysis 
been performed during the LASCAD92 project and had the identified risks been 
mitigated it would have reduced the risk of project failure. 
 
[H1] The causes of the failure identified in other analyses map onto risks identified by 
the Stakeholder impact analysis  
If hypothesis one is supported by the results then this corroborates that Stakeholder 
Impact analysis captures the risks captured by existing approaches. The hypothesis 
was tested by identifying the causes of the LASCAD92 failure as identified by the 
Official Inquiry and supporting academic literature and for each cause identifying the 
relevant risks raised by the Stakeholder Impact Analysis. 
 
[H2] Risks identified in the failed LASCAD92 project were appropriately 
mitigated/partially mitigated in the successful LASCAD96 project 
If hypothesis two is supported by the results then this corroborates that the kinds of 
risks identified by Stakeholder Impact Analysis have a significant impact on project 
performance if left unmitigated. Hypothesis two was tested by identifying if the 
changes to practices identified by [4] in their case-study of the successful turn-around 
(LASCAD96) mitigated or partially mitigated each risk identified by Stakeholder 
Impact Analysis. 
5   Results 
A summary of the results is presented to highlight the most significant risks 
identified by Stakeholder Impact Analysis. The results support both [H1] and [H2]. 
Hypothesis 1 is supported by the fact that all identified causes of failure in the 
literature map to risks identified by Stakeholder Impact Analysis thus illustrating it is 
able to comprehensively identify risks (See http://www.cs.st-
andrews.ac.uk/~dsg22/LASCAD/tables.pdf). Hypothesis 2 is supported by the fact 
that Stakeholder Impact Analysis found 24 stakeholder risks associated with the 
LASCAD 92 and 96 projects. Of these 24 risks, 2 were appropriately mitigated or 
partially mitigated during LASCAS 92. In contrast during LASCAD 96, 23 of the 24 
risks were appropriately mitigated or partially mitigated (See table 2). Since 
LASCAD 96 was considered a success this suggests that the Stakeholder Impact 
Analysis identifies risk factors that if left unmitigated contribute to stakeholder 
resistance and ultimately project failure. These findings give grounds for the 
statement that had Stakeholder Impact Analysis been performed during LASCAD 92 
it would have reduced the risk of project failure. 
 
Table 2 - Mitigated vs unmitigated risks and project outcomes 
# Partially 
Mitigated 
Unmitigated Project 
Outcome 
LASCAD92 2 22 Failure 
LASCAD96 23 1 Success 
 
 
Due to space restrictions only highlights of each stakeholders’ perspective will be 
provided starting first with control room staff, then LAS management and finally with 
ambulance crew. It was identified that control room staff may oppose the 
implementation for the following reasons: [C5] the system could be perceived to 
reduce their status as it was designed to routinise their work removing many elements 
of skill/local knowledge that previously existed; [C7] the project was a top-down 
initiative and there was a history of conflict and non-cooperation with management; 
[C8] the project could be perceived as distributively unfair as staff received little 
benefit from the  change but would need to retrain and there was a possibility of job 
cuts. In LASCAD96 the first risk [C5] was partially mitigated by the software being 
designed to support decision-making rather than automate it. This mitigated the risk 
as rather than routinising work and removing elements of skill it supplemented staff 
skill and knowledge. The second risk [C7] was partially mitigated by significant 
changes to LAS management and the building of cooperation by fulfilling staff 
requests e.g. the provision of a new more comfortable control room and the hiring of 
additional staff to reduce the burden of transition on existing staff. This mitigated the 
risk because management were less likely to be perceived as adversaries and partners 
to cooperate with. The third risk [C8] was mitigated as staff received improved 
working conditions and were given control of the roll out by being given a right to 
veto changes that they did not approve of. This mitigated the risk because staff now 
had control over changes and therefore were able to reject changes that were 
perceived to be deliver little net benefit. 
It was identified that the LAS management may oppose the project for the 
following reasons: [M2] they perceive that they would be given inadequate 
time/resource to make the project a success; [M3] they do not have the will or ability 
to develop skills to manage the system or its development; [M5] may be reluctant to 
report negative information to executes for fear of losing their status or job; [M6] due 
to poor past relations management may view control room staff or ambulance crew as 
being obstructive when providing genuine negative feedback about the system.  The 
first risk [M2] was mitigated in LASCAD92 by management being fearful for their 
jobs however the consequence of this was that management were reluctant to provide 
negative feedback (bad news) for fear of being seen as obstructive and thus losing 
their job. In LASCAD96 the risk was mitigated by an executive level commitment to 
provide whatever resources and time needed as well as fostering an atmosphere of 
openness. This mitigated the risk managers as the availability of resources and time 
reduced the perception of inadequate resources or time being made available. The 
second risk [M3] was mitigated in LASCAD92 by top-down pressure to meet 
ORCON targets and risks of job losses. In LASCAD96 this risk was mitigated by 
topdown pressure to meet targets, the provision of additional resources and 
restructuring to bolster management and operational staff. This mitigated the risk of 
lack of will or ability by providing a supportive atmosphere for staff and bringing in 
staff with additional skills and experience for others to learn from. The third risk [M5] 
was mitigated in LASCAD96 by introducing a flexible time-frame thus removing 
pressure for immediate results and also recent hiring of additional staff reinforcing the 
message that jobs were not at risk. This mitigated the risk because the reporting of 
negative information was no longer perceived as adversarial / a problem as there was 
plenty of time and there was no atmosphere of job losses. The forth risk [M6] was not 
mitigated in LASCAD92 or 96. 
It was identified that ambulance crew may oppose the project for the following 
reasons: [A2] the system could be perceived to interfere with crew values of ‘rapid 
response’ if it does not take into account crew experience and local knowledge; [A7] 
the system could be perceived as management interference and procedurally unjust 
due to ongoing issues with staff consultation; [A8] the system could be perceived as 
distributively unjust are crew lose a their autonomy from which derive little benefit. 
The first and second risks [A2][A7] were mitigated in LASCAD96 by entering into 
consultation with staff and involving crew with testing and approval of equipment 
prior to go-live. This mitigated the risks as crews could influence changes to ensure 
they did not conflict with their values or modes of operating. The third risk [A8] was 
mitigated by improving crew working conditions by issuing them with personal radios 
so they could communicate with themselves and also upgrading ambulances for 
comfort. This mitigated the risk because the crews could shape the changes to ensure 
the distribution of benefit/loss was fair as they perceived it. 
6    Lessons Learned 
The LASCAD 92/96 project emphasises the importance of stakeholder resistance 
and its impact on the success of IT projects. The following list identifies the main 
lessons learned from this case-study: 
• Resistance comprises stakeholders providing feedback on how they perceive a 
system to impact their local environment and therefore addressing their 
perceived risks is valuable as it facilitates good fit between their local and the 
system and the changes it brings about. 
• The majority of stakeholder risks can be appropriately mitigated, or partially 
mitigated, by senior management demonstrating that they are willing to invest 
the resources it takes to get a project done well and that they are open and 
respond to continuous consultation/feedback from all stakeholders. 
• Sources of continuous consultation/feedback are an important practice to 
mitigate risk these include: up-front consultation; ongoing drop-in sessions; user 
acceptance testing where users can delay go-live if unhappy. 
• Software and system design should be mindful of stakeholder values, 
satisfaction, and status. One particularly important area is to avoid fully 
automating user decision-making and instead supporting the user to make better 
decisions. This is beneficial as it reduces the risk of removing satisfying or status 
granting aspects work whilst simultaneously enabling the user to incorporate 
their local knowledge or expertise. 
• Stakeholder risks that are mitigated via coercion tend to dampen feedback loops 
between stakeholders resulting in poor communication and ultimately a project 
that is not a good fit with its environment and thus a failure. 
7  Conclusion 
It is concluded that: i) IT failures diagnosed as errors at the technical or project 
management levels are often mistakenly pointing to symptoms of failure rather than a 
project’s underlying socio-complexity which is regularly the actual source failure; ii) 
had Stakeholder impact analysis been performed during the LASCAD92 project and 
the identified risks had been mitigated it would have reduced the risk of project 
failure. 
Claim i) was corroborated by the fact that the LASCAD case study demonstrates 
that: a) most risks can be appropriately mitigated, or partially mitigated, by senior 
management demonstrating that they are willing to invest the resources it takes to get 
a project done well and that they are open and respond to continuous 
consultation/feedback from all stakeholders; b) sources of continuous 
consultation/feedback are an important practice to mitigate risks these include: up-
front consultation; ongoing drop-in sessions; User acceptance testing where users can 
delay go-live if unhappy; c) risks that are mitigated via coercion tend to dampen 
feedback loops between stakeholders resulting in poor communication and ultimately 
a project that is not a good fit with its environment and thus a failure. 
Claim ii) was corroborated by the fact that: d) the risks identified map onto causes 
of failure identified in other analyses of the failure; e) all the risks identified in the 
LASCAD92 project were mitigated in the successful LASCAD96 project suggesting 
their mitigation contributed to the success of the project. The conclusion is limited by 
the usual limitations of case-study research. 
Future work is planned to corroborate these findings with other case studies and 
also perform statistical studies of IT project performance to establish the average 
performance impact of each kind of Socio-complexity derived risk factor as indicated 
in the Stakeholder Conflict Matrix. 
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